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1

Introduction

Uncertainty is pervasive and plays a major role in economics. Whether economic agents in the market pursuing individual goals or policy makers pursuing
social objectives, decision makers rarely have complete information about objective
probability distributions over relevant states of the world. Descriptively valid understanding of individual behavior in the face of uncertainty is of great importance
for constructing realistic economic models capable of making accurate predictions,
as well as improving decision making processes in prescriptive applications.
Following the early insights from Arrow (1951), and the recent discussions in
Hansen (2014), Marinacci (2015) and Hansen and Marinacci (2016), the framework guiding our investigations decomposes uncertainty into three distinct layers
of analysis. Specifically, we consider a decision maker (DM), who possesses exante information about a set of possible probability models characterizing inherent
randomness within a phenomenon of interest, but is uncertain about the true
probability model among the set of possible models. Thus, a distinction is made
between (i) risk, where the uncertainty –of aleatory or physical type– is about the
possible outcomes within a given probability model, and (ii) model uncertainty
where there exists a second layer of uncertainty –of epistemic nature– concerning
which alternative model should be used to assign probabilities. More specifically,
risk represents situations where the consequences of the actions taken by a DM depend on the states of the world over which there is an objectively known probability
distribution. Model uncertainty characterizes situations with limited information
where the DM cannot identify a single probability distribution corresponding to
the phenomenon of interest. As such, this second layer of uncertainty may be
quantified by means of subjective probabilities across the models under consideration. In addition, the DM may face situations where the set of probability models
under consideration may not even include the true model. This third layer of
uncertainty is known as (iii) model misspecification. It represents the approximate
nature of probability models, which are often simplified representations of more
complex phenomena.
These three distinct layers of uncertainty are inherent to any decision problem
under uncertainty where the DM adopts probabilistic theories about the outcomes
of a phenomenon and forms beliefs over their relevance. In practice, this decomposition of uncertainty into layers provides a useful framework to analyze the vast
majority of decision problems under ambiguity.1 As an example, in Ellsberg’s
1

Following the seminal work of Ellsberg (1961), ambiguity is the term that has emerged in the
literature to characterize the situations in which “the DM does not have sufficient information to quantify
through a single probability distribution the stochastic nature of the problem she is facing” (Cerreia-
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(1961) classical experiment, which has been the standard tool to study ambiguity
in economics, the two-color ambiguous urn with a total number of N balls displays
both the layers of risk and model uncertainty. Specifically, an ambiguous urn with
N balls provides N + 1 possible physical compositions of the urn, each of which
constitutes a risk, whereas the distribution over the compositions, unknown to
the DM, constitutes the epistemic uncertainty in the second layer (note that, by
construction, there is no third layer in this case). In real-life problems, such as
the choice of an optimal environmental policy in the face of climate change, the
first layer may represent the probability distribution of the long term temperature
response to greenhouse gas emissions. As multiple instances of this distribution
exist –depending on the climate models employed or the type of data used to estimate the probabilistic relationship– a second layer of uncertainty emerges as the
uncertainty surrounding these different models. Lastly, the potential misspecification of the existing climate models gives rise to the third layer. Thus, the climate
policy maker has to deal with uncertainty consisting of the three distinct layers.
Until now, the research in economics has generally focused on the layers of
risk and model uncertainty when considering decisions under ambiguity. Our
study is the first which goes beyond these two layers and examines the role played
by model misspecification. When modeling uncertain situations, DMs use their
best available information to specify uncertainties, correcting and removing any
model misspecification that they are aware of. From this perspective, it may seem
impossible to implement the third layer of model misspecification in an experiment,
at least without using deception. In our experiment, we overcome the difficulties
by using a modified Ellsberg setting encompassing all the three layers. We are
thus able to pin down the relative importance of each distinct layer to the total
effect of uncertainty.
Traditionally, the way economists have dealt with uncertainty is by following
the Subjective Expected Utility approach (Savage 1954, henceforth, SEU). In line
with the Bayesian tradition, this approach holds that any source of uncertainty
can be quantified in probabilistic terms and in this sense can be treated similarly
as risk, reducing uncertainty de facto to its first layer. In this approach, there is
no role for ambiguity attitudes. Whether for purely descriptive purposes, or with
a clear normative appeal, several lines of research have then been developed to
accommodate the results of the research initiated by Ellsberg (1961). In particular,
two types of non-SEU theories that relate to the multi-layer representation of
uncertainty entail relaxing some of the critical assumptions of SEU: reduction
of compound probabilities and source independence (i.e. no distinction between
Vioglio et al., 2013a).
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physical and epistemic uncertainty).2
The first approach models ambiguity attitudes by relaxing the reduction principle between uncertainty presented in different stages, while still holding the source
independence assumption. Segal’s (1987) Anticipated Utility approach (See Quiggin, 1982) and Seo’s (2009) model posit considering any source of ambiguity as
compound risk.3 While these theories adopt a representation of ambiguity with
multiple stages of risk, they therefore do not distinguish between layers entailing
distinct types of uncertainty present at different stages. Accordingly, no distinction
exists between compound risk (where there are two stages of physical uncertainty)
and model uncertainty (where there are distinct layers of physical and epistemic
uncertainty). As non-neutral ambiguity attitudes result from the violation of an
elementary rationality condition, these theories assign to ambiguity attitudes a
purely descriptive status.
The second approach models ambiguity attitudes by source dependence, assuming different attitudes towards different layers of uncertainty (e.g. a preference for
physical uncertainty over epistemic uncertainty). The smooth ambiguity model of
Klibanoff et al. (2005) (see also Nau, 2006 and Ergin and Gul, 2009) distinguishes
the layers of risk and model uncertainty by assuming different utility functions
for attitudes towards aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. Hence, the reduction
principle still holds for compound risk (physical uncertainty present in different
stages) but not for model uncertainty. Other studies by Chew and Sagi (2008),
and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) also explicitly model ambiguity attitudes by source
dependence without any implications about compound risk (as they do not adopt
a multi-stage approach).
The main objective of this paper is to elicit individuals’ attitudes towards different sources of uncertainty consisting of multiple layers and to understand to
what extent these attitudes are associated with attitudes towards ambiguity. Our
investigation makes two contributions to the ambiguity literature in economics.
First, we shed new light on the explanatory power of different theoretical approaches proposed in the literature to accommodate non-neutral ambiguity attitudes. Specifically, exploring model uncertainty along with the corresponding
instances of compound risk, our laboratory experiment reveals the interaction of
2

Note that we here mainly focus on theories consistent with the Bayesian tradition which uses a single
probability measure to quantify probabilistic judgments within each layer of uncertainty. Multiple prior
models such as the one proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) are discussed later in the paper.
3
Segal (1987) writes “Indeed, most writers in this area, including Ellsberg himself, suggested a
distinction between ambiguity (or uncertainty) and risk. One of the aims of this paper is to show
that (at least within the anticipated utility framework) there is no real distinction between these two
concepts.” (p 178-179). Thus, he proposes “risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are two sides of the
same coin, and the rejection of the Ellsberg urn does not require a new concept of ambiguity aversion,
or a new concept of risk aversion.” (p 179).
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source dependence and reduction of compound probabilities, and their relative
importance in explaining ambiguity attitudes. Second, we provide the first experimental evidence on the role of model misspecification in decision making under
uncertainty. While the importance of model misspecification has been conjectured
by several studies (Hansen and Marinacci, 2016; Berger and Marinacci, 2017) no
theory has formally incorporated it yet.4 By gauging how much can be gained
by incorporating model misspecification, our study informs future research in this
direction.
There are four main findings emerging from our analysis. First, attitudes towards ambiguity and uncertainty explicitly presented in different stages are closely
related. Second, the association with ambiguity attitudes is however stronger for
model uncertainty than for compound risk. Thus, we find strong evidence for
the role of source dependence. Third, we find that model misspecification is an
intermediate case between model uncertainty and ambiguity, although it is not
the main driver of attitudes towards ambiguity. Ambiguity attitudes are mostly
captured by attitudes towards model uncertainty. Lastly, our results indicate that
the degree of complexity of the decision problem plays an important role. In particular, when the level of complexity of the task is reduced, or when only more
sophisticated subjects are considered, the association between attitudes towards
ambiguity and compound risk tends to disappear, suggesting separate normative and descriptive considerations for each of them. Overall, these findings also
contribute to the debate on whether ambiguity preferences found in experiments
should be considered as a deviation from rationality, or instead, could be seen as
a rational way to cope with uncertainty.

2

Experimental design

This section presents our experimental design. We use a within-subject design
to examine choices under different sources5 of uncertainty generated in an Ellsberg setting. The experiment is run with student subjects, with real monetary
incentives.
4

Modeling it is challenging as it requires a trade-off between “tractability and conceptual appeal”
(Hansen and Marinacci, 2016, pg. 511).
5
We here adopt the definition of sources of uncertainty, proposed by Abdellaoui et al. (2011), as
“groups of events that are generated by the same mechanism of uncertainty, which implies that they
have similar characteristics” (p. 696).

5
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1249 [2018]

2.1

The sources of uncertainty

We consider the following six sources of uncertainty in an Ellsberg two-color
setting with decks containing black and red cards.
1. Simple Risk, denoted by SR, entails a deck containing an equal proportion
of black and red cards;
2. Compound Risk, denoted by CR, entails a deck that contains either p% red
((100−p)% black) or p% black ((100−p)% red) cards with equal probability;
3. Model Uncertainty, denoted by M U , entails a deck that contains either p%
red ((100 − p)% black) or p% black ((100 − p)% red) cards with unknown
probability;
4. Model Misspecification, denoted by M M , entails a deck that is likely to
contain either p% red ((100 − p)% black) or p% black ((100 − p)% red) cards,
and may or may not contain any other proportion of red and black cards.
5. Extended Ellsberg, denoted by EE, entails a deck that contains an unknown
proportion of black and red cards;
6. Standard Ellsberg, denoted by SE, entails a deck of 100 cards that contains
an unknown proportion of black and red cards.
In sources 2-4, we consider two situations: one with p = 0 and the other with
p = 25. For example, CR with p = 0 entails a deck that contains either 0% red
(100% black) or 0% black (100% red) with equal probability, whereas CR with
p = 25 entails a deck that contains either 25% red (75% black) or 25% black (75%
red) with equal probability. The cases of M U and M M are constructed similarly
for the two proportions. We denote these respective cases as CR0, CR25, M U 0,
M U 25, M M 0, and M M 25.
The sources CR, M U and M M differ in the layers of uncertainty they encompass (and hence in the type of second order probabilities considered). Specifically,
CR entails only the layer of risk (even if it is presented in a compound way, using different stages). Under CR, the two possible deck compositions, p% and
(100 − p)% red (or black) cards, are unambiguously assigned objective probabilities 50%. Conversely, the source M U entails both a layer of model uncertainty
and one of risk. Under M U , the two possible deck compositions can only be assigned subjective probabilities. On the basis of symmetry, defined in Section 4.1,
these subjective probabilities will be assumed to be 50%. Finally, the source M M
entails the three layers of uncertainty together.
6
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Our treatment M M can be interpreted as a form of M U , where a larger number
of models is considered. For many subjects, the treatment M M might be psychologically similar to model misspecification, and our framing serves to induce this
perception. Indeed, in many applications, the term model misspecification has
been used in our sense (Hansen and Sargent, 2001b,a; Hansen et al., 2006; Hansen
and Marinacci, 2016), for what formally can be taken as an extra layer of model
uncertainty. Hence, the treatment M M serves as a good proxy for the third layer,
from which useful insights can be obtained.
While EE corresponds, in spirit, to Ellsberg’s (1961) ambiguous situation
where “numerical probabilities are inapplicable”, it has to be noted that it slightly
differs from the situation SE originally used by Ellsberg, where the total number
of cards in the deck is known. Here, we consider SE for the sake of comprehensiveness and for allowing comparisons with previous literature. Yet, remark that
formally speaking, SE can be interpreted as an instance of M U with two layers of
uncertainty only, since 101 physical compositions of the deck are possible. Therefore, EE and SE differ in that the former (where the number of cards composing
the deck is unknown) may be seen as entailing the three layers of uncertainty
together (as a set of probability models can be postulated, but this set may not
contain the true model).
2.2

Procedure

The experiment was run on computers. Subjects were seated in cubicles, and
could not communicate with each other during the experiment. Each session
started with the experimental instructions, examples of the stimuli, and comprehension questions. Complete instructions and comprehension questions are
presented in the Online Appendix.
Five experimental sessions were conducted at Bocconi Experimental
Laboratory for Social Sciences (BELSS) in Bocconi University, Italy. The subjects
were 125 Bocconi University students having various academic degrees, mostly
from economics, management and marketing departments (average age 20.5 years,
52 female). Each session lasted approximately one hour including instructions and
payment.
Subjects

During the experiment, subjects faced nine monetary prospects under the different uncertain situations introduced earlier: SR, CR0, CR25, M U 0,
M U 25, M M 0, M M 25, EE, and SE. Each prospect gave the subjects either
e20 or e0 depending on the color of a card randomly drawn from a deck. In
Stimuli

7
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every prospect, the color giving e20 was picked by the subjects themselves. The
prospects under SR, CR0, CR25, M U 0, M U 25, M M 0, M M 25, and EE were
constructed with decks containing an unspecified number of cards. In SR, the subjects were instructed that the deck contained an equal proportion of red and black
cards. In the cases of CR, M U , M M , and EE the subjects were instructed that
the deck was going to be picked randomly from a pile of decks. In CR0 (CR25),
the pile was composed of decks containing 0% black (25% black) cards and decks
containing 0% red (25% red) cards, with an equal proportion of each. In M U 0
(M U 25), the pile was also composed of decks containing 0% black (25% black)
and decks containing 0% red (25% red) cards, but with an unknown proportion
of each. In M M 0 (M M 25), the majority (at least half) of the pile consisted of
decks containing 0% black (25% black) and decks containing 0% red (25% red)
cards with an unknown proportion of each. Notably, the subjects were instructed
that the pile may or may not contain decks with compositions other than the two
described. In EE, the pile was composed of decks containing red and black cards
each with an unknown composition. Lastly, SE involved a single deck containing
100 cards with an unknown proportion of black and red cards.
All the decks and piles were constructed in advance by one of the authors, who
was not present in the room during the experimental sessions. Thus, no one in
the room, including the experimenters, had any additional information about the
content of the decks and piles, other than what was described in the experimental
instructions. The subjects were informed accordingly to prevent the effects of
comparative ignorance (Fox and Tversky, 1995). The subjects were also reminded
that they could check the piles and the decks at the end of the experiment to
verify the truthfulness of the descriptions of prospects.
We elicited the certainty equivalents (CE) of the nine prospects using a choicelist design. Specifically, in each prospect, the subjects were asked to make twelve
binary choices between the prospect of receiving e20 and receiving a sure monetary amount ranging between e0 and e20. The sure amounts were incremented
by e2 between e1 and e19. In what follows, we take the midpoint of an indifference interval implied by a switching point as a proxy for the CE of the prospect.
Switching in the middle of the list implies a CE equal to the expected payoff.
The order of SR, CR0, CR25, M U 0, M U 25, M M 0, M M 25, and EE were
randomized, whereas SE was always presented at the end to prevent a priming effect about the number of cards in the decks. After completing the nine choice lists,
the subjects answered six multiple-choice questions that intended to measure their
numeracy skills. These questions entailed calculation of probabilities in a chance
game involving random draws from two decks with specific proportions of red and
8
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black cards. Lastly, the subjects were presented with several items intended to
elicit self-reported risk attitudes in real life situations. The questionnaire ended
with demographics questions.
The subjects received a e5 show-up fee. In addition, they received
a variable amount depending on one of the choices that they made during the experiment. The choice situation on which the payment was based was the same for
every subject in a given session. In practice, twelve binary choice questions on the
choice lists (each containing a decision problem between the prospect of receiving
e20 based on the color of the card to be drawn and different monetary amounts)
and the descriptions of nine uncertain situations (under which the card was going
to be drawn) were printed on paper and physically enclosed in sealed envelopes
before every experimental session. In each experimental session, a volunteer from
the subjects randomly picked two envelopes before the experiment started: one
from the nine envelopes each containing an uncertain situation and another from
the twelve envelopes each containing a question from the choice lists. The two
envelopes picked, still sealed, were then attached to a white board visible to all
participants. The subjects were informed that the choice situation that would matter for their payment was contained in the envelopes, which would remain visible
and closed until the end of the experiment. When all the subjects completed the
questionnaire, the envelopes were opened, and the contents were revealed to the
subjects. The draws from the piles and/or from the decks were made as described
under the uncertain situation contained in the first envelope, and the subjects
were paid according to their recorded decision in the choice question contained in
the second envelope.6
Incentives

3

Related experimental literature

Previous experimental studies have investigated the link between different
sources of uncertainty and ambiguity. Most of these studies questioned the possibility to completely characterize ambiguity by means of compound risks. Using
urns presenting simple risk, compound risk and ambiguity, Yates and Zukowski
(1976) and Chow and Sarin (2002) found that simple risk is most preferred, ambiguity is least preferred, and compound risk is intermediate between the two. In the
same vein, Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) found less aversion towards compound
6

Note that this prior incentive system (Johnson et al., 2015) slightly differs from the standard random
incentive system in that it performs the randomization before, rather than after, the choices and the
resolutions of uncertainty. Its theoretical incentive compatibility in Ellsberg experiments was proved in
Baillon et al. (2014).
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risk than what is typically found under ambiguity, questioning therefore the possibility to characterize completely ambiguity by means of compound risk. More
recently, Halevy (2007) reported the results of an experiment confirming that, on
average, subjects prefer compound risk situations to ambiguous ones. However,
his experiment also suggested a tight association between ambiguity neutrality
and reduction of compound risk (ROCR). Qualitatively similar results concerning
the association between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk were reported by Dean and Ortoleva (2015). Armantier and Treich (2016) also suggested
a tight association between attitudes towards ambiguity and complex risks, where
probabilities are objective but non-trivial to compute.7 On the contrary, using a
setup close to Halevy’s, Abdellaoui et al. (2015) found significantly less association
between compound risk reduction and ambiguity neutrality. In particular, they
showed that, for more sophisticated subjects, compound risk reduction is compatible with ambiguity non-neutrality, suggesting that failure to reduce compound
risk and ambiguity non-neutrality do not necessarily share the same behavioral
grounds. Relatedly, in an experiment with children, Prokosheva (2016) obtained
a significant relationship between arithmetic test scores and compound risk reduction, while no such relationship was found between ambiguity neutrality and
these scores. Finally, using designs closer to ours, Chew et al. (2017) and Berger
and Bosetti (2017) extended the investigations to the role of model uncertainty.
Whereas Chew et al. (2017) observed very similar attitudes towards compound
risk and model uncertainty,8 Berger and Bosetti (2017) only reported a significant
association between attitudes towards ambiguity and model uncertainty, but not
between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk.

4

Theoretical predictions

Following the exposition of our experimental design, we now describe the preferences predicted by different theories of choice under uncertainty for the prospects
considered in the experiment. Given that uncertainty is explicitly represented
through different stages in the prospects we present, we focus on theoretical models that accommodate such representation of uncertainty. Since –to our knowledge– no theoretical setup has so far explicitly accommodated all three layers of
risk, model uncertainty and model misspecification together, we concentrate on
7
Kovářı́k et al. (2016) also experimentally studied attitudes towards both complexity and ambiguity,
but without considering the association between them.
8
Note that Chew et al. (2017) did not refer to “model uncertainty” to characterize two-layer uncertainty, but rather talked about “partial ambiguity”. Their partial ambiguous prospects are then used
to investigate the association with compound risk.
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theories with a clear two-layer perspective. These include subjective expected
utility (SEU), maxmin preferences, families of smooth preferences and families of
recursive non-expected utility preferences.
4.1

The setting

We denote the set of states of the world as S and the set of consequences as
C. Formally, a prospect is a function P : S → C, mapping states into consequences. That is, P(s) is the consequence of prospect P when s ∈ S obtains.
In our setting, each of the nine prospects involves a bet on the color of a card
drawn being either red or black. While the state space consists of 29 states, we
restrict our attention to 9 payoff-relevant events each describing whether the bet is
correct or not in a given situation. Hence, a prospect Pi results in a consequence
c ∈ {e0, e20} depending on which state of the world si ∈ {red, black} realizes in situation i ∈ P = {SR, CR0, CR25,M U 0, M U 25, M M 0, M M 25, EE, SE}.
States are thus seen as realizations of underlying random variables that are part
of a data generating mechanism. We assume that the DM has a complete and
transitive preference relation % over prospects.
Abstracting from the issue of model misspecification, we assume that the DM
knows that states are generated by a probability model m which belongs to a collection M .9 Each model m therefore describes a possible data generating mechanism
(i.e. a possible composition of the deck) and as such represents the inherent randomness that states feature. In our experiment, M is either singleton, as in the
case of the risky prospect SR, or contains two elements (except for SE, in which
|M | = 101). To ease the derivation and presentation of our theoretical predictions, we now impose a symmetry assumption and define then notion of relative
premium.
For each uncertain prospect, the DM is indifferent to
the color on which to bet (red or black).10
Symmetry condition:

Definition:

The (relative) premium Πi is defined as the difference
Πi ≡ CESR − CEi ∀i ∈ P\ {SR} .

9

Formally, we assume the existence of a measurable space (S, Σ) , where Σ is an algebra of events of
S. A model m : Σ → [0, 1] is thus a probability measure, and the collection M is a finite subset of ∆(S),
the collection of all probability measures.
10
The symmetry condition has been supported empirically in preceding studies by Abdellaoui et al.
(2011), Chew et al. (2017) and Epstein and Halevy (2018). In our experiment, given that our subjects pick their own color to bet on in the ambiguous prospects, asymmetric beliefs implies only an
underestimation of ambiguity aversion.
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In words, this premium represents the difference between the certainty equivalent
for the simple risk and the certainty equivalent for the uncertain prospect. The
premium is positive (resp. zero, or negative) when a subject is more (resp. as
much, or less) averse to the uncertain prospect than to the simple risk. This
premium represents in turn the compound risk premium (Abdellaoui et al., 2015),
or the ambiguity premium (Berger, 2011; Maccheroni et al., 2013), depending on
the prospect considered.
4.2

Subjective expected utility

The benchmark model we consider is the subjective expected utility (SEU)
model originally due to Savage (1954). In its two-layer version axiomatized by
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013b), it is assumed that the DM has a subjective prior
probability µ : 2M → [0, 1] quantifying the epistemic uncertainty about models.
This subjective prior reflects the structural information received and some personal
information the DM may have on models. The subjective expected utility of a bet
on prospect Pi is
!
VSEU (Pi ) =

X

X

µ (m)

m

p(s|m)u (Pi (s)) .

(1)

s

In this expression, u : C → R is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
capturing risk attitude, and p(s|m) is the objective probability of state s conditional on model m. Criterion (1) is a Bayesian two-stage criterion that describes
both layers of uncertainty via standard probability measures. The same attitude
is considered towards both risk and model uncertainty. In its reduced form due
Savage (1954), it might be rewritten
VSEU (Pi ) =

X

µ̄(s)u (Pi (s)) ,

(2)

s

P

where µ̄(s) =
m µ(m)p(s|m) is the predictive subjective probability induced
by prior µ through reduction. Unsurprisingly, when we normalize u(0) = 0, we
obtain:
VSEU (Pi ) = 0.5u(20)

∀i ∈ P.

(3)

In other words, SEU predicts that all uncertain prospects lead to the same expected utility level. To see this, remark that in the case of SR, M is a singleton, so that criterion (1) reduces to the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern,
where epistemic uncertainty does not play any role. In the cases of CR0 and
12
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CR25, it is assumed that the subjective prior beliefs over models coincide with
the objective probabilities, and the two stages of risk are reduced into a single one
(i.e. ROCR). In the cases of M U 0 and M U 25, the symmetry condition imposes
µ(m) = 0.5 for each model, while in the standard Ellsberg case (SE), the result
follows from the symmetry condition imposing µ(m) = µ(m0 ) for all m, m0 such
that p(s|m) = 1 − p(s|m0 ). Finally, note that while the prospects M M 0, M M 25
and EE do not have a formal existence within such a two-layer setup (where the
true model is assumed to belong to M , which is itself finite), we can infer from
the preceding analysis that they lead to exactly the same level of expected utility
under the symmetry condition. In terms of premia, the predictions in the SEU
case are then summarized as:
∀i ∈ P.

Πi = 0
4.3

(4)

Maxmin models

The family of theories we now examine relax the assumption of equal treatment
between the layers of risk and model uncertainty. These theories thus depart from
the Bayesian framework presented above. The first decision criterion, which is due
to Wald (1950), is the most extreme in that it considers only the worst among
the possible models affected by epistemic uncertainty. The second criterion is
less extreme and originates in the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and
Schmeidler (1989).
The decision criterion due to Wald (1950) fosters an extreme form of ambiguity aversion in that it makes the DM consider only the model giving her the
lowest expected utility level:
Wald

VWald (Pi ) = min
m

X

p(s|m)u (Pi (s)) .

(5)

s

It should be noted that the layer of risk is not affected by the extreme cautiousness
entailed by such criterion. When the maxmin criterion is derived in order to
address the epistemic uncertainty of the second layer (as in Marinacci, 2015), it
makes no prediction regarding the way the DM evaluates compound risks. It is
therefore perfectly conceivable to assume that the three prospects entailing the
layer of risk only (SR, CR0, CR25) are treated the same way, as in the SEU case.
The predictions under Wald’s criterion may then be written as11
11

In the presentation of the predictions that follows, we consider deviations from ambiguity neutrality
as strict.
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0 = ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 < ΠM U 25 < Πi

∀i ∈ P\ {SR, CR0, CR25, M U 25} .

(6)

In the multiple priors (MP) model axiomatized by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), the incompleteness of information regarding the correct model
may result in the prior probability measure to be non-singleton. Instead, the DM
has a set C of priors µ, and makes her decision based on the prior giving rise to
the least favorable SEU. The two-layer version of this criterion is written:

Multiple priors

!
VMP (Pi ) = min
µ∈C

X

X

µ(m)

m

p(s|m)u (Pi (s)) .

(7)

s

This formulation encompasses the original version of the MP model proposed by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which is recovered when considering predictive
subjective probabilities µ̄(s). In our case, the symmetry conditions translates to a
symmetric set of priors C, giving therefore rise to ambiguity aversion. For the risk
situations (SR, CR0, CR25), the MP model –which is built within the Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) framework– predicts the same CEs for all (compound) risks
with the same expected utility. Together, these predictions are summarized as:
0 = ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 < Πi

∀i ∈ P\ {SR, CR0, CR25} .

(8)

It should be noted that this criterion is not as extreme as it appears at first
sight. Under the MP model, the minimization is realized over the set C which
incorporates both a taste component (the attitude towards ambiguity) and an
information component (the way ambiguity is perceived). These two components
are inherently indistinguishable so that a smaller set C may reflect better information and/or less ambiguity aversion. This flexibility allowed in the construction
of C moreover leads to a wide range of possible choice behavior in the ambiguous prospects we present, preventing therefore any finer ranking order.12 Finally,
when the set of priors C is singleton, we are back to the SEU criterion (1), which
predicts equality among all the relative premia.
4.4

Smooth models

Contrary to the maxmin theories, the next family of decision criteria model the
different layers of uncertainty via standard probability measures (i.e. unique µ). In
12

Note that the same predictions under ambiguity aversion would hold for the more general α-version
of the MP model that has been axiomatized by Ghirardato et al. (2004) and in which both the “max”
and the “min” appear with weights α and 1 − α.
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this case however, the independence assumption between the stages of uncertainty
is dropped to allow for distinct treatment of simple risk, and either compound risk
or model uncertainty situations. The utility of betting on prospect i under the
smooth criterion is
!
Vsmt (Pi ) =

X

µ (m) φ

m

X

p(s|m)u (Pi (s)) ,

(9)

s

where φ : Im u ⊆ R → R is a strictly increasing and continuous function representing in turn preferences towards ambiguity (KMM’s version) and compound
risk (Seo’s version).13
By dropping the independence assumption between the layers of uncertainty, the version of the smooth model due to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005, hereafter KMM) and Marinacci (2015) allows for a distinct treatment of
risk and model uncertainty. While it has been implicitly assumed that identical
attitudes were considered towards uncertainty quantified via objective and subjective probabilities in (1), the more general version (9) distinguishes these attitudes.
In particular, this is made explicit once we write v = φ ◦ u , where v : C → R
captures the attitude towards model uncertainty (i.e. towards epistemic uncertainty, Marinacci, 2015). In this sense, the ambiguous prospect may be regarded
as being evaluated in two steps: for each model m, the DM first computes a
certainty equivalent c(m) using her risk attitude modeled by u, while in a second step she evaluates the overall prospect by taking the expected utility over
these certainty equivalents using her subjective prior µ and her attitude towards
model uncertainty, modeled by v. In this respect, aversion to model uncertainty
is represented by a concave function v, which is interpreted as aversion to mean
preserving spreads in the certainty equivalents induced by each model. Ambiguity aversion in this model (concave φ) therefore results from a higher degree of
aversion to model uncertainty than to risk, while the SEU case is recovered when
both degrees are identical. Since compound risk prospects feature two stages of
the same layer of risk, each stage is evaluated using risk aversion u only. This
theory therefore incorporates ROCR. Finally, also remark that M U 0 presents the
maximum spread in the space of certainty equivalents c(m) and should therefore
be considered as the least favorable prospect by each subject exhibiting ambiguity
aversion. In terms of premia, the predictions for an ambiguity averse subject are
KMM

13

Note that Nau (2006) and Ergin and Gul (2009) characterized representations that, at least in special
cases, can take the same representation as (9) and share the same interpretation as KMM’s version.
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0=

= ΠCR25

(10)

0 < ΠM U 25 < ΠM U 0

(11)

0<

ΠCR0
ΠSE

≤ ΠM U 0 .

(12)

As before, extending loosely the criterion to account for the third layer of misspecification by considering, instead, the set of models M = [0, 1], enables us to
draw the following additional predictions:

0 < Πi ≤ Π M U 0

∀i ∈ {M M 0, M M 25, EE} .

(13)

In words, expression (13) says that, if anything, misspecification is perceived at
least as good as M U 0, which is characterized by the extreme spread of models
(since in this case, non-degenerate probability distributions may not be excluded).
In the approach proposed by Seo (2009), the distinction is not only made
between the layers of risk and model uncertainty, but also between the first and
the second stages of risk. In that sense, ambiguity aversion may as well result from
non-reduction of objective compound risk. Attitudes towards objective probabilities presented in two stages or towards model uncertainty and ambiguity are thus
closely related (in the words of Seo (2009), ROCR implies neutrality to ambiguity). Formulation (9) implies distinct expected utilities in the different stages.
When φ is linear, the DM reduces the two stages of uncertainty into a single one
and Vsmt collapses to the SEU formulation (2). Consistent with what precedes,
Seo’s (2009) predictions under ambiguity aversion may be summarized as follows
Seo

0 < ΠCR25 = ΠM U 25 < ΠCR0 = ΠM U 0
0 < ΠSE ≤ ΠCR0 = ΠM U 0 .

(14)
(15)

Once the criterion is extended to allow for considering misspecification, we furthermore have

0 < Πi ≤ ΠCR0 = ΠM U 0

∀i ∈ {M M 0, M M 25, EE} .

(16)
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http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1249

18

Aydogan et al.: Three Layers of Uncertainty: an Experiment

4.5

Recursive non-expected utility models

Other approaches which violate the ROCR axiom and expected utility theory
have been proposed. An example is the theory proposed by Segal (1987; 1990)
which uses, to evaluate the first and second stage of uncertainty, either Quiggin’s
(1982) rank dependent utility or Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion. According
to these approaches, ambiguous prospects are seen as two-stage risks which are
evaluated by the DM using the previously mentioned two-step procedure: each
second-stage lottery is first replaced by its certainty equivalent before the overall
value of the prospect is computed at the first-stage. The difference with previous
theories, however, lays in the way the certainty equivalents and the global prospect
are evaluated. In what follows, we outline two distinct approaches.
In the rank dependent utility (RDU) model
of Quiggin (1982), the lottery x = (x(1), p(1); ...; x(n), p(n)) with x(1) ≥ ... ≥ x(n)
is evaluated by
Recursive rank dependent utility

VRDU (x) = u(x(n)) +

n
X

[u(x(s − 1)) − u(x(s))] f

s=2

s−1
X

!
p(t) .

(17)

t=1

In this expression, f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1, is an increasing
transformation function, which is furthermore convex under uncertainty aversion.
A certainty equivalent c(m) = u−1 (VRDU (x|m)) may then be computed for each
model m separately, and the overall prospect is then evaluated recursively using
(17) and the priors µ on these CE’s. The recursive rank dependent utility (RRDU)
of prospects SR, CR0 and CR25, giving 20 if the bet is correct and 0 otherwise,
are then for example computed as:

VRRDU (PSR ) = VRRDU (PCR0 )
= u(20)f (0.5)
> VRRDU (PCR25 )


= u(20)f (0.25) + u−1 (u(20)f (0.75) − u−1 (u(20)f (0.25) f (0.5).
Under the symmetry assumption, compound risk and model uncertainty prospects
are evaluated the same way, so that VRRDU (PCR0 ) = VRRDU (PM U O ) and VRRDU (PCR25 ) =
VRRDU (PM U 25 ). When f is convex, CR0 is preferred to SE.14 Together, these pre14

Note that the common empirical finding in the literature is uncertainty seeking for low likelihood
events and uncertainty aversion for moderate and high likelihood events, which implies inverse S-shaped
–first concave and then convex– f (Wakker, 2010). Here, we focus on moderate probabilities where
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dictions are written

0 = ΠCR0 = ΠM U 0 < ΠCR25 = ΠM U 25
0 ≤ ΠSE .

(18)
(19)

In the disappointment aversion (DA) model
of Gul (1991), the value VDA (x) of the lottery x = (x(1), p(1); ...; x(n), p(n)) is given
by the unique solution of the equation:
Recursive disappointment aversion

P
υ=

{s:u(x(s))≥υ}

P
p(s)u(x(s)) + (1 + β) {s:u(x(s))<υ} p(s)u(x(s))
P
.
1 + β {s:u(x(s))<υ} p(s)

(20)

In this expression, β ∈ (−1, ∞) is the coefficient of disappointment aversion (if
β > 0) or elation seeking (if β < 0). The outcomes are separated into two groups:
the elating outcomes (which are preferred to the lottery x) and the disappointing
outcomes (which are worse than the lottery x). The DM then evaluates x in an
expected utility way, except that disappointing outcomes are given a uniformly
extra weight under disappointment aversion. As before, a certainty equivalent is
then computed for each model m separately, and the overall value of the twostage prospect is evaluated recursively using the same preferences on these CEs
and the prior measure µ. Unsurprisingly, when β = 0, this criterion collapses to
the SEU criterion (1). Using the recursive disappoint aversion (RDA) model, it is
then easy to see that a disappointment averse DM always prefers any two-stage
prospect to be resolved in a single stage (or to be degenerate in the second stage).
In particular, if in our case a bet gives 20 if correct and 0 otherwise, we have:

VRDA (PSR ) = VRDA (PCR0 ) = VRDA (PM U O )
= u(20)
> VRDA (PCR25 ) = VRDA (PM U 25 )




0.75u(20)
0.5(1 + β) 0.25u(20)
0.5
+
.
=
1 + 0.5β 1 + 0.25β
1 + 0.5β
1 + 0.75β
Under the interpretation that ambiguity aversion amounts to preferring objective
simple risks to compound (non-degenerate) ones, Artstein and Dillenberger (2015)
show that a disappointment averse DM exhibits ambiguity aversion for any posuncertainty aversion is prevalent.
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sible beliefs about the model. The predictions under the RDA approach are then
the same as under RRDU, summarized in (14) and (15).

5

Results

5.1

Quality of data and consistency

The data we collected consist of 124 observations for M U 25, and 125 observations for the rest of the prospects.15 A total of 39 (3.5% of all) choice lists from 14
different subjects exhibited multiple-switching, no-switching or reverse-switching
patterns. These observations were not included in the following analysis as the
CEs for these patterns do not imply a clear measure and may be due to confusion.
We do not observe any order treatment effect on the CEs (details are reported in
Appendix D).
5.2

General results

One of our main objectives is to observe the attitudes towards different sources
of uncertainty, possibly encompassing distinct layers of uncertainty. Figure 1
summarizes statistics on relative premia for CR, M U , M M , EE, and SE (the
complete descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A). First, we can observe
that, in line with the standard findings in the literature, the average relative
premia are positive, indicating an aversion to compound risk and ambiguity. The
premia differ from zero in all cases (t-test, p-value<0.001),16 except for CR0 (ttest, p-value = 0.580) indicating indifference between simple and compound risk
in this case, consistent with the ROCR. Interestingly, reduction is rejected in the
case of M U 0, where the complexity of the problem is the same as in CR0, but
where there is a second layer involving subjective probabilities.
Second, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures, indicates that the relative premia for the sources CR, M U and M M
are different from each other (p-value<0.001). Looking at the pairwise comparisons, CR differs from both M U and M M (MANOVA with repeated measures,
p-value<0.001 for both). M U and M M are marginally different (MANOVA with
repeated measures, p-value=0.054). Overall, our data suggest a strong increasing
trend in relative premia moving from compound risk, to model uncertainty and
model misspecification, within both p = 0 and p = 25 (Page’s L-test for increasing
15

One subject omitted answering to choice situation M U 25 by mistake.
Throughout, non-parametric Wilcoxon tests give the same conclusions on rejecting or not rejecting
the null hypothesis.
16
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Source of Uncertainty

Figure 1: Mean (relative) premia and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the 9
prospects

trend, p-value<0.001 for p = 0 and p-value=0.003 for p = 25). The relative premia are also on average higher for p = 25 than for p = 0 across the three sources
of uncertainty (repeated measures MANOVA, p-value<0.001). The premia difference between the treatments with p = 25 and p = 0 is significant for CR (t-test,
p-value<0.001) and for M U (t-test, p-value=0.006), and marginally significant for
M M (t-test, p-value=0.053) .
Finally, our data do not reveal a significant difference between relative premia for EE and SE (t-test, p-value=0.110). The slight preference for SE can
be ascribed to the distinction between inherent model uncertainty and model misspecification in SE and EE respectively, which is consistent with our observations
on M U and M M . This is an interesting feature of SE: being technically composed of two layers of uncertainty only (no misspecification by construction), it is
still virtually able to replicate behaviors under EE, encompassing the three layers.
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5.3

Associations

The relationship between ambiguity and compound risk has been extensively
discussed in the literature (Halevy, 2007; Abdellaoui et al., 2015; Chew et al.,
2017). Here, while re-examining the strength of this relationship, we are able to
further extend the analysis by looking at the association of ambiguity with uncertainty presented in two- (M U ) and three layers (M M ). The conjecture we want
to test is that stronger associations exist between ambiguity and the latter two
sources of uncertainty, than between ambiguity and CR. In what follows, we focus
on EE as representing ambiguity in the spirit of Ellsberg, since it better reflects
a situation of unmeasurable uncertainty encompassing the three layers of uncertainty altogether. Our findings are also robust to the use of SE as representing
ambiguity.
5.3.1

Ambiguity neutrality and reduction

Here, we distinguish between types of reduction under different sources of uncertainty. We first replicate the analysis of preceding studies with contingency
tables relating ambiguity neutrality (AN) and ROCR using our data. Then, we
extend the analysis by considering reduction of M U (ROMU) and reduction of
M M (ROMM). In what follows, a subject is classified as reducing compound risk
if she assigns zero relative premia to both CR0 and CR25. ROMU and ROMM
are defined similarly (i.e. ΠM U 0 = ΠM U 25 = 0 and ΠM M 0 = ΠM M 25 = 0, respectively). A subject is classified as AN if she assigns zero relative premia to EE.
Table 1 reports the contingency tables relating ROCR, ROMU and ROMM with
AN.
Table 1: Association between ambiguity neutrality and ROCR, ROMU,
ROMM
ROCR
(ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 = 0)
Ambiguity neutrality
(ΠEE = 0)
No
Yes
Total

ROMU
(ΠM U 0 = ΠM U 25 = 0)

ROMM
(ΠM M 0 = ΠM M 25 = 0)
Total

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

61 (51.8)

15 (24.2)

69 (55)

7 (21)

73 (59.6)

3 (16.4)

76

52.6%

12.9%

59.5%

6%

62.9%

2.6%

65.5%

18 (27.2)

22 (12.8)

15 (29)

25 (11)

18 (31.4)

22 (8.6)

40

15.5%

19%

12.9%

21.6%

15.5%

19%

34.5%

79

37

84

32

91

25

116

68.1%

31.9%

72.4%

27.6%

78.4%

21.6%

100%

Fisher’s exact tests (2-sided):

p<0.001

p<0.001

p<0.001

Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses. Relative frequencies indicated in %.

As can be observed, our data confirm the previous findings in the literature
by rejecting the independence hypothesis between AN and ROCR, although the
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association found in our data is relatively weak. Specifically, we observe that
among the 37 subjects who reduce compound risk, 22 (59.5%) are also ambiguity
neutral, and among the 40 subjects who are ambiguity neutral, 22 (55%) reduce
compound risk. Compared to the preceding studies, the proportion of AN conditional on ROCR is significantly lower in our data than the 96% (22 out of 23
subject) found in the data of Halevy (2007) (p-value=0.002), or the 95% (39 out
of 41 subjects) found in the data of Chew et al. (2017) (p-value<0.001).17 In Appendix B, we provide a more comprehensive comparison of our results with the
ones previously obtained in the literature.
Turning to ROMU, our data suggest a larger overlap between ROMU and AN
than between ROCR and AN. In the direction of ROMU implying AN, out of
the 32 subjects reducing M U , 25 (78%) exhibited AN. This proportion is higher
than the proportion of AN conditional on ROCR (59.5%), although the difference
is marginal (p-value=0.097). Looking at the converse implication, out of the 40
subjects exhibiting AN, 25 (62.5%) reduced M U . This proportion is also slightly
higher than the proportion of ROCR conditional on AN in our data (55%), however
the difference is not significant (p-value=0.496).
Lastly, our data indicate an even larger overlap between AN and ROMM.
Out of the 25 subjects reducing M M , 22 (88%) exhibited AN, and out of the
40 subjects exhibiting AN, 22 (55%) reduced M M . The proportion of AN conditional on ROMM is higher than the proportion conditional on ROCR (59.5%)
(p-value=0.015). The proportion of AN conditional on ROMM is also slightly
higher than the proportion conditional on MU (78%) but this difference is not
significant (p-value=0.331) .
5.3.2

Associations of attitudes

We now extend the previous analysis concerning ambiguity neutrality and reduction by examining the associations of attitudes towards the different sources
of uncertainty. Accordingly, the contingency tables, reported in Table 2, relate
aversion, seeking and neutrality attitudes towards EE and the other sources of
uncertainty. Here, a subject is classified as CR averse (seeking) if she assigns a
positive (negative) relative premium for both CR0 and CR25. As in the previous
section, CR neutrality is defined as zero relative premia for both CR0 and CR25.
We define attitudes towards M U and M M analogously.
17

Similarly, the proportion of ROCR conditional on AN in our data is significantly lower than the 79%
(22 out of 28 subjects) found in the data of Halevy (p-value=0.045). The strength of the association
suggested in the data of Abdellaoui et al. (2015) is comparable to our study (p-value=0.22 for AN
conditional on ROCR, and p-value=0.334 for the converse implication).
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37

57.8%

21

32.8%

Total
9.4%

6

3.1%

2 (0.6)

4.7%

3 (2.6)

1.6%

1 (2.8)

Seeking
(ΠCR0 < 0 &
ΠCR25 < 0)

100%

64

9.4%

6

43.8%

28

46.9%

30

Total

4

Fischer’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

4.8%

32
38.1%

48
57.1%

2 (0.1)

2.4%

2 (1.4)

0%

0 (2.4)

Seeking
(ΠM U 0 < 0 &
ΠM U 25 < 0)

2.4%

0 (1.1)

29.8%

25 (11.4)

8.3%

7 (19.4)

Neutral
(ΠM U 0 =
ΠM U 25 = 0)

Model Uncertainty (MU)

0%

1.2%

1 (1.7)

3.6%

3 (17.1)

52.4%

44 (29.1)

Averse
(ΠM U 0 > 0 &
ΠM U 25 > 0)

Independence test:
Fischer’s exact test (2-sided): p = 0.001
Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses. Relative frequencies indicated in %.

3.1%

34.4%

4.7%

2 (3.5)

22 (16.2)

3 (9.2)

3.1%

20.3%

25%

2 (2)

13 (17.3)

16 (9.8)

Seeking
(ΠEE < 0)

Neutral
(ΠEE = 0)

Averse
(ΠEE > 0)

Ambiguity

Neutral
(ΠCR0 =
ΠCR25 = 0)

Averse
(ΠCR0 > 0 &
ΠCR25 > 0)

Compound Risk (CR)

100%

84

3.6%

3

35.7%

30

60.7%

51

Total

65.5%

57

2.3%

2 (3.3)

4.6%

4 (19)

58.6%

51 (34.7)

Averse
(ΠM M 0 > 0 &
ΠM M 25 > 0)

5.8%

5

2.3%

2 (0.3)

3.5%

3 (1.7)

0%

0 (3)

Seeking
(ΠM M 0 < 0 &
ΠM M 25 < 0)

Fischer’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

28.7%

25

1.2%

1 (1.4)

25.3%

22 (8.3)

2.3%

2 (15.2)

Neutral
(ΠM M 0 =
ΠM M 25 = 0)

Model Misspecification (MM)

Table 2: Association between ambiguity attitude and attitudes towards CR, MU, and MM

100%

87

5.8%

5

33.3%

29

60.9%

53

Total
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The results indicate that, similar to the previous contingency tables with neutrality and reduction, there is a significant relation between attitudes towards EE
and CR. Furthermore, we replicate the stronger associations between EE and
M U , and between EE and M M . In particular, the proportion of observations on
the diagonals is significantly higher in the tables for M U and M M compared to
the table for CR (p-value=0.002 for M U and p-value<0.001 for M M ).
The differences in associations are also revealed in the pairwise correlations of
the relative premia, reported in Table 3. The multivariate tests of correlations
indicate that the relative premium for EE is more strongly correlated with the
premium for M U than it is with the premium for CR. This result is valid for both
p = 0 and p = 25 (p-value<0.05). There is also a stronger correlation between
EE and M M than between EE and CR, although this difference is significant
for p = 0 (p-value<0.001) but not for p = 25 (p-value=0.142).
Table 3: Correlation Matrices of Attitudes towards Different Sources
Ambiguity & Compound Risk
ΠEE
ΠEE

1

ΠCR0

0.3099

ΠCR0

∗∗∗

ΠCR25

ΠEE
ΠEE

1

ΠCR25 0.5593+ 0.4318
Notes:

Ambiguity & Model Uncertainty

ΠM U 0
1

ΠM U 0

ΠM U 25

ΠEE

1
0.6134∗∗

Ambiguity & Model Misspecification

ΠEE
1

ΠM U 25 0.7456∗ 0.6118

1

ΠM M 0

ΠM M 25

1

ΠM M 0

0.6609∗∗∗

1

ΠM M 25

0.6786

0.7231

1

Star signs indicate differences across correlation matrices where the first matrix (ambiguity & compound risk) is the base.

significantly different from the corresponding correlation under CR at 0.1% level;

∗∗

significantly different from the corresponding correla-

tion under CR at 1% level; ∗ significantly different from the corresponding correlation under CR at 5% level. Plus signs indicate differences
between the correlations of ΠEE with the other premia within the given correlation matrix.

++

significantly different from the correlation

between ΠEE and Πi (where i ∈ {CR0, M U 0, M M 0} represents the source within the given matrix at 1% level;

+

significantly different from

the correlation between ΠEE and Πi within the given matrix at 5% level.

5.3.3

Further results

We now explore the role of complexity (i.e. making a distinction between relatively easy vs. more difficult tasks) and the role of numerical ability (i.e. making a
distinction between relatively more quantitatively sophisticated vs. less sophisticated subjects) in the association between AN and the other sources of uncertainty.
As already noticed in Section 5.2, our results reveal a
significant difference between the relative premia for the two cases of compound
risk, CR0 and CR25. The distinct treatments between these two prospects is
not really surprising as CR0 may be claimed to be more easily reducible than
CR25 (for someone who wants to reduce the CR, degenerate probabilities in the
The role of complexity
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second stage are indeed easier to manipulate).18 In what follows, we focus on the
relatively simpler prospects with degenerate risk in the second stage. Specifically,
we report, in Table 4, the results of the association between AN and ROCR or
ROMU respectively. The definition of ambiguity neutrality remains as in the analysis above (i.e. ΠEE = 0), while to define ROCR (ROMU) we now require only
one equality to hold, namely ΠCR0 = 0 (ΠM U 0 = 0). With such a definition
Table 4: Association between ambiguity neutrality and ROCR, ROMU in
the case p = 0
ROCR
(ΠCR0 = 0)
Ambiguity neutrality
(ΠEE = 0)
No
Yes
Total

ROMU
(ΠM U 0 = 0)

No

Yes

No

Yes

Total

35 (30)

40 (45)

59 (45.7)

16 (29.3)

75

30.4%

34.8%

51.3%

13.9%

65.2%

11 (16)

29 (24)

11 (24.3)

29 (15.7)

40

9.6%

25.2%

9.6%

25.2%

34.8%

46

69

70

45

115

40%

60%

60.9%

39.1%

100%

Fisher’s exact tests (2-sided):

p =0.049

p <0.001

Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses. Relative frequencies indicated in %.

of ROCR, focused on the simple task, 60% of our sample is indifferent between
the simple and the compound risk (consistent with what is found in Berger and
Bosetti, 2017). This is in contrast with the 39% of subjects who reduce the model
uncertainty under the analogous simple task. Notably, the only difference between
the two prospects, CR0 and M U 0, is the nature of the probabilities in the first
stage. Considering this simple task, the association between AN and ROCR is
weaker and only significant at the 5% level. In particular, while only 35 subjects
among the 75 ambiguity non-neutral subjects (46.7%) do not reduce CR, 59 subjects out of the same 75 subjects (78.7%) do not reduce model uncertainty. These
proportions significantly differ (p-value<0.001). Similarly, while the proportion of
ambiguity neutrality among subjects reducing CR was 42% (29 out of 69), the proportion among subjects reducing M U was 64.4% (29 out of 45). This proportions
also differ significantly (p-value=0.0193).
At the end of the experiment, six multiple-choice
questions were used to test subjects’ quantitative skills. The answers to these
questions enable us to investigate the impact of numeracy on AN, ROCR and
The role of cognitive skills

18

Note that given the low degree of complexity they carry, compound risks with degenerate second
stage have also been used in the literature to test the “time neutrality” hypothesis (i.e. risk resolving
entirely in the first stage of two, rather than in one stage).
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ROMU. A latent-mixture model is estimated to classify subjects into two groups:
a low-skilled group whose likelihood of getting the right answer in any multiplechoice question is assumed to be 1/6 (as there were 6 choice options with 1 correct
answer), and a high-skilled group whose likelihood of getting the right answer is
assumed to be higher. The model is estimated by Bayesian inference methods using
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm run through WinBUGS software.19
A subject is classified as a member of a group if her posterior distribution indicated
that she belongs to the group with at least 95% probability. The estimations
result in 95 classified subjects (55 high-skilled, 40 low-skilled). Table 5 reports
the contingency tables relating AN and ROCR for these high- and low-numeracy
groups. The contingency tables in Part 1 suggest that the relationship between
AN and ROCR is weaker among the high numeracy group. In particular, both the
proportion of AN conditional on ROCR and the proportion of ROCR conditional
on AN are lower in the high numeracy group than in the low numeracy group.
Hence, the hypothesis of independence between AN and ROCR is not rejected in
the high numeracy group, whereas it is rejected in the low numeracy group despite
smaller number of observations there. The same impact of numeracy skills is not
observed on the relationship between AN and ROMU. The contingency tables
in Part 2 indicate that the association between AN and ROMU was strong for
both low and high numeracy groups. The association between AN and ROMM
(whose contingency table is not reported here) is also robust to the differences
in numeracy skills (p-value<0.001, Pearson χ2 , for both low and high numeracy
subjects).20
5.4

Individual level analysis

In this section, we report the results of the individual level analysis. We classify subjects on the basis of the proximity of their preference patterns over different sources of uncertainty to the predictions of the theoretical models of choice
presented in Section 4. Our classification is based on the five prospects (SR,
CR0, CR25, M U 0, and M U 25), which gives us ten binary comparisons with
∆ij = CEi − CEj where i, j ∈ {SR, CR0, CR25, M U 0, M U 25} and i 6= j. We
19
Two chains, each with 100.000 MCMC samples, are run, after a burn-in of 1000 iterations. Only
every tenth observation is recorded to reduce the autocorrelation. The WinBUGs code is available upon
request. For further details on the Bayesian modeling through WinBUGS, see Lee and Wagenmakers
(2014) providing a practical introduction to the subject.
20
The same patterns are also observed when the associations are between attitudes, i.e. aversion,
seeking and neutrality, as in Table 2. The independence of ambiguity and CR attitudes is rejected
among low numeracy group (p-value=0.003, Pearson χ2 ) but it is not rejected among the high numeracy
group (p-value=0.115, Pearson χ2 ). The associations between ambiguity and M U /M M attitudes are
robust in both groups (p-value<0.001, Pearson χ2 for all the associations).
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Table 5: Association between ambiguity neutrality and ROCR/ROMU by
numeracy groups

Part I
Low Numeracy Subjects
Ambiguity neutrality
(ΠEE = 0)
No

Yes

Total

ROCR (ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 = 0)

High Numeracy Subjects
ROCR (ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 = 0)

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Total

21
(16.9)

4 (8.1)

25

22
(19.2)

9 (11.8)

31

52.5%

10%

62.5%

40%

16.4%

56.4%

6 (10.1)

9 (4.9)

15

12
(14.8)

12 (9.2)

24

15%

22.5%

37.5%

21.8%

21.8%

43.6%

27

13

40

34

21

55

67.5%

32.5%

100%

61.8%

38.2%

100%

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided):

p =0.006

p = 0.163

Part II

Ambiguity neutrality
(ΠEE = 0)
No

Yes

Total
Fisher’s exact test (2-sided):

Low Numeracy Subjects

High Numeracy Subjects

ROMU (ΠM U 0 = ΠM U 25 = 0)

ROMU (ΠM U 0 = ΠM U 25 = 0)

No

Yes

Total

No

Yes

Total

24
(18.1)

1 (6.9)

25

28
(21.4)

3 (9.6)

31

60%

2.5%

62.5%

50.9%

5.5%

56.4%

5 (10.9)

10 (4.1)

15

10
(16.6)

14 (7.4)

24

12.5%

25%

37.5%

18.2%

25.4%

43.6%

29

11

40

38

17

55

72.5%

27.5%

100%

69.1%

30.9%

100%

p <0.001

p < 0.001

Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses. Relative frequencies indicated
in %.

consider the predictions of the following theories: (Classical) SEU, Smooth model
of KMM (2005), RRDU of Segal (1987) and the theory of Seo (2009). SEU predicts
reduction in both CR and M U . The theories of Segal and Seo both predict violations of ROCR and ROMU, and they do not distinguish between CR and M U .
These two theories differ in their predictions of preferences over mean preserving
spreads as discussed in Section 4. KMM model makes the same predictions on the
mean preserving spreads as the theory of Seo, but it differs in predicting no viola-
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tions of ROCR. Within each non-SEU theory, the preference patterns compatible
with ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking are distinguished. Following this
classification based on CR and M U , the compatibility with the observed ambiguity
attitudes based on EE is examined. As before, subjects are classified as ambiguity
averse (AA) if they exhibit ΠEE > 0, ambiguity neutral (AN) if ΠEE = 0, and
ambiguity seeking (AS) if ΠEE < 0. The analysis is done using data collected
from subjects who did not exhibit any multiple switching patterns, and thus had
no missing CE data.
The classification into the different theoretical models is done using a latent
mixture model estimation, which takes the stochastic component of responses
into account. Each ∆ij is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a mean
being zero, non-positive, or non-negative. The estimation of the latent model is
performed using Bayesian methods,21 assuming uninformative uniform priors for
mean (with a range between 0 and 10 for non-negative ∆ij and between −10 and
0 for non-positive ∆ij ) and for standard deviation (ranging between 0 and 10)
of ∆ij . The analysis results in an estimated likelihood of each theoretical model
for every subject. The subjects are classified with the theoretical model that is
estimated as the most likely for them. Overall, our latent mixture model performs
well in detecting distinct preference patterns predicted by the theoretical models.
In particular, for 83% of the subjects (92 out of 111), the theoretical model that
is estimated as the most likely is at least twice as likely as the model estimated as
the second most likely.22 The descriptive validity of the model is supported by the
posterior prediction tests, where the estimated posterior distributions are able to
predict the observed patterns in the data accurately (see Appendix C.1 for further
details).
Table 6 reports the classification results based on our latent mixture analysis
and their distribution across the observed ambiguity attitudes. Based on SR,
CR, and M U , we observe that 61% of the subjects (68 out of 111) are classified
as non-SEU. 30% of all observed preferences are consistent with the KMM model,
whereas 22% are consistent with RRDU, and 9% with Seo’s theory. Focusing on
the compatibility with ambiguity attitudes, among subjects classified as SEU, 67%
(29 out of 43) are consistent in satisfying ambiguity neutrality defined as ΠEE = 0.
We also observe that for the majority of the non-SEU subjects, the preference
patterns within CR and M U are compatible with the observed ambiguity attitudes
21
Three chains, each with 10.000 MCMC samples, are run, after a burn-in of 1000 iterations. Only
every tenth observation is recorded to reduce the autocorrelation.
22
Among seven preference patterns under consideration (SEU, and ambiguity averse and ambiguity
seeking classes in three non-SEU theories), the most likely theoretical model received at least 50%
likelihood for 93% of the subjects (103 out of 111).
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based on preferences towards EE. The proportion of compatibility is as high as
85% (28 out of 33) for KMM model, 80% (8 out of 10) for the theory of Seo, and
60% (15 out of 25) for RRDU.
Table 6: Individual types with two-stage perspective
Ambiguity attitude
Compound risk and
model uncertainty attitudes
SEU

ambiguity neutral
ambiguity averse

KMM
ambiguity seeking
ambiguity averse
RRDU
ambiguity seeking
ambiguity averse
Seo
ambiguity seeking
Total

AA
(ΠEE > 0)

AN
(ΠEE = 0)

AS
(ΠEE < 0)

13 (24.8)

29 (15.1)

1 (3.1)

43

11.7%

26.1%

0.9%

38.7%

25 (16.1)

2 (9.8)

1 (2)

28

22.5%

1.8%

0.9%

25.2%

1 (2.9)

1 (1.8)

3 (0.4)

5

0.9%

0.9%

2.7%

4.5%

15 (9.2)

1 (5.6)

0 (1.2)

16

13.5%

0.9%

0%

14.4%

3 (5.2)

6 (3.2)

0 (0.6)

9

2.7%

5.4%

0%

8.1%

5 (2.9)

0 (1.8)

0 (0.4)

5

4.5%

0%

0%

4.5%

2 (2.9)

0 (1.8)

3 (0.4)

5

1.8%

0%

2.7%

4.5%

64

39

8

57.7%
35.1%
7.2%
Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses.
Relative frequencies indicated in %. Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001.

Total

111
100%

In Appendix C.2, we provide the results of an individual level analysis based
on a different, less sophisticated, method (i.e. counting the number of choice patterns consistent with each set of theoretical predictions), and show that similar
conclusions may be drawn.

6

Conclusion

We have investigated the relationship between attitudes towards different sources
of uncertainty, possibly encompassing different layers, namely risk, model uncertainty and model misspecification. By doing so, our study gives a new interpretation of the mechanisms behind ambiguity preferences. Specifically, our design
enables us to shed new light on the relationship between ambiguity neutrality and
different types of reduction, among which reduction of compound risk, reduction of
model uncertainty and reduction of model misspecification. While we find some
evidence on the relationship between ROCR and ambiguity neutrality, we also
find that this association is far from the almost perfect one found in other studies
(Halevy, 2007; Chew et al., 2017). Rather, we find that ambiguity preferences
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are more tightly associated with preferences towards other layers of uncertainty.
Moreover, the relationship between CR and ambiguity attitudes seems to disappear when the level of complexity of the CR is reduced, or when the subjects
are quantitatively more sophisticated. On the contrary, the association between
M U (or M M ) and ambiguity attitudes is robust to these factors. Overall, these
findings could be seen as leaning in favor of the source dependence perspective in
explaining ambiguity attitudes, while also supporting the idea that complexity is
another important characteristic of a source of uncertainty (Armantier and Treich,
2016).
These experimental results bear important implications for the normative interpretation of ambiguity attitudes. In particular, if one sees the violation of
independence in risky choices as a departure from rationality, and if subjects who
are ambiguity non-neutral are also less likely to reduce CR, then this weakens the
potential for ambiguity aversion models to claim a normative status. In this case
indeed, evidence would support the idea of Ellsberg’s type of behaviors as violating “Bayesian rationality”, which assumes probabilistic sophistication (Machina
and Schmeidler, 1992, 1995) –i.e. the existence of unique subjective probabilities,
together with their updating and manipulation using classic probability formulas– usually coupled with SEU. On the contrary, the stronger association between
attitudes towards ambiguity and towards sources of uncertainty encompassing different layers that we document in this paper leaves room for an interpretation of
Ellsberg behaviors as rational responses to situations of uncertainty where probabilities are unknown. Thus, our results question the Bayesian notion of rationality
–which has traditionally been the standard approach in economics– while giving
support to the work of Gilboa et al. (2008, 2009, 2010, 2012); Gilboa and Marinacci (2013); Mukerji (2009), who have recently challenged it on the grounds of
the inability of Bayesian priors to reflect the DM’s lack of information. Accordingly, behaving differently in the absence of objective information compared to
the situations where objective information is available could also be regarded as
rational. In that sense, our results leave open the possibility to use ambiguity
models with normative purposes in real world problems where the information is
limited.
The present investigation also expands the existing literature by empirically
studying the role played by the third layer of model misspecification on preferences
towards ambiguity. Even if our treatment M M can be interpreted as a form of
M U –simply with the number of probability models increased– we have argued
that it can serve as a good proxy for model misspecification. In many applications,
the term model misspecification has been used in the sense implied by our design,
30
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i.e. for what formally can be taken as an extra layer of uncertainty (Hansen, 2014;
Hansen and Marinacci, 2016). Although, strictly speaking, it may seem impossible
to generate genuine unawareness in an experiment, at least without using deception, by using our proxy, insights can be obtained into the importance of model
misspecification. Specifically, we have shown that our M M source is an intermediate case lying between model uncertainty and ambiguity à la Ellsberg (SE). It is
also the source of uncertainty most strongly associated with ambiguity. Although
the difference between M U and M M is not always substantial in our experiment
(since attitudes towards M U capture a good part of the uncertainty attitude), one
can use our results to infer that misspecification issues are potentially important
in real-life problems, where the symmetry condition does not play any role. As
such, our study highlights the importance of future theoretical developments to
capture decisions under M M .
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Appendix
A

Descriptive statistics

In Tables A.1 and A.2, we provide the descriptive statistics of the data we
collected in terms of certainty equivalents and relative premia, respectively.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statitstics of the Certainty Equivalents
Mean

Median

Mode

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Obs

SR

9.55

10

8

3.52

0.5

19.5

120

CR0

9.46

10

8∗

3.59

0.5

19.5

122

CR25

8.12

8

8

3.56

0.5

19.5

119

MU0

8.31

8

6

3.80

0.5

19.5

121

M U 25

7.75

8

6

3.71

0.5

19.5

120

MM0

7.87

8

6

3.48

0.5

19.5

122

M M 25

7.43

6

6

3.58

0.5

19.5

121

SE

7.75

8

10

3.83

0.5

19.5

123

EE

7.30

6

4

3.76

0.5

19.5

119

Notes: ∗ Multiple modes exist. The lowest value is shown.

Table A.2: Descriptive Statitstics of the (relative) Premia
Mean

Median

Mode

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Obs

ΠCR0

0.102

0

0

2.48

-6

8

118

ΠCR25

1.402

0

0

1.99

-4

10

117

ΠM U 0

1.176

0

0

2.52

-4

8

119

ΠM U 25

1.812

2

0

2.70

-6

12

117

ΠM M 0

1.714

2

0

2.51

-4

10

119

ΠM M 25

2.096

2

0

2.89

-4

10

120

ΠSE

1.857

2

0

2.88

-6

12

119

ΠEE

2.302

2

0

2.93

-4

12

116
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B

Association between ambiguity neutrality and reduction of two-stage uncertainty in the literature

In this appendix, we present the results of the association between ambiguity
neutrality and ROCR or ROMU previously obtained in the literature. Table B.1
reports the contingency tables relating ROCR with AN as originally presented
in different studies. While in general the results seem consistent in rejecting the
independence hypothesis between AN and ROCR, it has to be noted that the
definitions used for AN and ROCR vary from one study to another. For example,
in Halevy (2007) the condition for AN is met if the subject is indifferent between
a simple risk and Ellsberg’s ambiguous urn with 10 balls, while the condition for
ROCR is met if the subject reduces two instances of compound risk: one with
a degenerate second stage (comparable to our CR0) and another with a uniform
distribution over 11 possible second-stage probabilities. In Chew et al. (2017), AN
corresponds to indifference between a simple risk and five different instances of
model uncertainty, while ROCR corresponds to reduction of five different instances
of compound risk.
This heterogeneity in the definitions used for ambiguity neutrality and reduction of compound lottery makes the comparison between different studies nontrivial. Yet, overall we can observe a pattern already discussed in Section 5.3.3:
ROCR is more prevalent when the complexity of the task is reduced. This is for
example the case in Prokosheva (2016), where 42% of the subjects meet the condition of ROCR, defined as a single indifference between a simple risk and a CR25
prospect generated with an urn containing 4 balls. In the same vein, reduction
is also more often observed in our study (32% of our subjects, see Table 1) using
only binary risk in the first stage than in the studies using more complex cases of
compound risk as in Halevy (2007); Abdellaoui et al. (2015); Chew et al. (2017);
Dean and Ortoleva (2015).
To overcome the problem of comparing results using various definitions of AN
and ROCR, we present in Table B.2 a comparison between our results and the
ones recently obtained by Chew et al. (2017) using common definitions. In this
case, AN corresponds to ΠSE = 0, ROCR to ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 = 0, and ROMU to
ΠM U 0 = ΠM U 25 = 0. As can be observed in the first part of the table, the results
concerning AN are very close to each other, with 62% and 63% of subjects being
ambiguity non-neutral (p-value=0.844, two-sided test of equality of proportions).
Yet, in our experiment 32% of subjects reduce compound risk, while only 22%
did in Chew et al.’s (2017) study (p-value=0.048, two-sided test of equality of
proportions).
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15.5%

23
16.2%

4.2%

119

83.8%

28

100%

142

19.7%

85.2%

98

14.8%

17 (25.6)

70.4%

81 (72.4)

14.8%

17

11.3%

13 (4.4)

3.5%

4 (12.6)

100%

115

26.1%

30

73.9%

85

Total

3 (24.3)
2%

27 (5.7)
18.2%

30
20.3%

117 (95.7)

79.1%

1 (22.3)

0.7%

118

79.7%

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

100%

148

18.9%

28

120
81.1%

Yes

No

Total

41.5%

56

34.1%

46 (24.5)

7.4%

10 (31.5)

Yes

100%

135

43.7%

59

56.3%

76

Total

16.5%

31

16%

30 (6.6)

0.5%

1 (24.4)

Yes

100%

188

21.3%

40

78.7%

148

Total

31.9%

37

19%

22 (12.8)

12.9%

15 (24.2)

Yes

100%

116

34.5%

40

65.5%

76

Total

AN corresponds to ΠSE = 0 with 10 balls in the urn,

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

68.1%

79

15.5%

18 (27.2)

52.6%

61 (51.8)

No

This paperf

Pearson’s chi-square test: p < 0.001

83.5%

157

5.3%

10 (33.4)

78.2%

147 (123.6)

No

Chew et al. (2017)c

b

AN corresponds to ΠSE = 0 with 2 balls in the urn, ROCR corresponds indifference between the sim-

d

AN corresponds to ΠSE = 0 with 40

to ΠEE = 0, ROCR corresponds to ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 = 0.

lottery Li ≡ xi/40 0 gives x with probability i/40 and 0 otherwise). e AN corresponds to ΠSE = 0 with 4 balls in the urn, ROCR corresponds to ΠCR25 = 0 with 4 balls. f AN corresponds

balls in the urn, ROCR corresponds to ΠCRunif = 0 with 40 balls, where CRunif is the CR (L0 , 1/41; ...; L40 , 1/41; ), yielding the binary lottery Li with probability 1/41 (the binary

(x0 0, 1/52; x0.01 0, 1/52; ....; x0.25 0, 1/52; x0.75 0, 1/52; ; x0.76 0, 1/52; ...; x1 0, 1/52), CR0 ≡ (x0 0, 1/2; x1 0, 1/2), CR25 ≡ (x0.25 0, 1/2; x0.75 0, 1/2).

ence between the binary risk x0.5 0 and the following CR: (x0.25 0, 1/51; x0.26 0, 1/51; ...; x0.74 0, 1/51; x0.75 0, 1/51), (x0 0, 1/101; x0.01 0, 1/101; x0.02 0, 1/101; ....; x0.99 0, 1/101; x1 0, 1/101),

M U 0 ≡ (x0 0, ?; x1 0, ?), M U 25 ≡ (x0.25 0, ?; x0.75 0, ?), where the probabilities each binary lottery is the true one are unknown (as marked by ?), ROCR corresponds to indiffer-

x0.5 0 and the following MU situations: (x0.25 0, ?; x0.26 0, ?; ...; x0.74 0, ?; x0.75 0, ?), (x0 0, ?; x0.01 0, ?; x0.02 0, ?; ....; x0.99 0, ?; x1 0, ?), (x0 0, ?; x0.01 0, ?; ....; x0.25 0, ?; x0.75 0, ?; ; x0.76 0, ?; ...; x1 0, ?),

ple risk x0.5 0 and the following CR: CR0 ≡ (x0 0, 1/2; x1 0, 1/2), (x0 0, 1/3; x0.5 0, 1/3; x1 0, 1/3), (x0 0, 1/4; x0.5 0, 1/2; x1 0, 1/4). c AN corresponds to indifference between the binary risk

lottery Li ≡ xi/10 0 gives x with probability i/10 and 0 otherwise).

ROCR corresponds to ΠCR0 = ΠCRunif = 0 with 10 balls, where CRunif is the CR (L0 , 1/11; ...; L10 , 1/11; ), yielding the binary lottery Li with probability 1/11 (the binary

a

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

58.5%

79

9.6%

13 (34.5)

48.9%

66 (44.5)

No

Prokosheva (2016)e

22 (4.5)

6 (23.5)

114
80.3%

Yes

Dean and Ortoleva (2015)d

0.7%

79.6%

No

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

1 (18.5)

113 (95.5)

Total

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

Yes

No

Abdellaoui et al. (2015)b

Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses. Relative frequencies indicated in %.

Independence test:

Total

Yes

No

Ambiguity neutrality

Independence test:

Total

Yes

No

Ambiguity neutrality

Halevy (2007)a

Reduction of Compound Risk (ROCR)

Table B.1: Association between ambiguity neutrality and ROCR in the literature
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Table B.2: Comparison association between ambiguity neutrality and ROCR
(Part I) or ROMU (Part II) using common definitions

Part I
Reduction of Compound Risk (ROCR): ΠCR0 = ΠCR25 = 0
Chew et al. (2017)a
Ambiguity neutrality
ΠSE = 0
No
Yes
Total
Independence test:

No

Yes

117 (93)
62.2%

30 (54)
16%

This paperb

Total

No

Yes

2 (26)

119

60 (50.4)

14 (23.6)

74

1.1%

63.3%

50.4%

11.8%

62.2%

39 (15)

69

21 (30.6)

24 (14.4)

45

20.7%

36.7%

17.6%

20.2%

37.8%

147

41

188

81

38

78.2%

21.8%

100%

68.1%

31.9%

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

Total

119
100%

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

Part II
Reduction of Model Uncertainty (ROMU): ΠM U 0 = ΠM U 25 = 0
Chew et al. (2017)a
Ambiguity neutrality
ΠSE = 0
No
Yes
Total
Independence test:

No

Yes

112 (84.8)
59.6%

22 (49.2)
11.7%

This paperb

Total

No

Yes

Total

7 (34.2)

119

65 (54.1)

9 (19.9)

74

3.7%

63.3%

54.6%

7.6%

62.2%

47 (19.8)

69

22 (32.9)

23 (12.1)

45

25%

36.7%

18.5%

19.3%

37.8%

134

54

188

87

32

119

71.3%

28.7%

100%

73.1%

26.9%

100%

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

Fisher’s exact test (2-sided): p < 0.001

Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses. Relative frequencies indicated in %.

a

The M U 0

situation is represented by an deck with 100 cards, that can be either all red or all black. b The M U 0 situation is represented by an
Urn with only 1 ball, that can be either red or black. c The M U 0 situation is represented by an Urn with 100 balls, that can be either
all red or all black.

Turning to ROMU, which is presented in the second part of the table, we observe that unlike ROCR, the proportions of subjects who reduce M U are similar
in the two experiments (p-value=0.728, two-sided test of equality of proportions).
In terms of association, our findings are comparable to Chew et al. (2017) for the
association between AN and ROMU (two-sided tests of equality of proportions in
two data sets: p-value=0.081 for proportions of AN conditional on ROCR, and
p=0.068 for the converse implication). Concerning the association between AN
and ROCR, we found a lower association in our data than in Chew et al. (2017)
(two-sided tests of equality of proportions in two data sets: p-value=0.0004 for
proportions of AN conditional on ROCR, and p=0.738 for the converse implication).
35
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

37

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1249 [2018]

C

Extended individual level analysis

In this appendix, we provide further results on the individual analysis described
in Section 5.4.
C.1

Descriptive validity of latent mixture model

Figure C.1 below shows the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the predicted
data for the CE differences based on the posterior distributions of the latent mixture model. The predictive distributions are obtained by taking the mean of the
posterior predictive samples as the predictor of each observation in the data. The
resulting predictive distributions are compared with the actual data observed. The
predictions are close to the actual data observed, with some over-prediction of the
difference between SR and M U 25, and the difference between CR0 and M U 25.
The sign of the differences are always predicted correctly.

Figure C.1: Posterior Predictive Distributions of CE differences

C.2

Simple individual analysis

We here report the results of a simple individual type analysis completing the
results of Section 5.4. As before, we classify subjects in terms of the proximity of
the observed choices to the predictions of the theory of choice under uncertainty
that specifically consider uncertainty in two stages (since we focus on SR, CR, and
M U ). We classify the subjects either as SEU, KMM, RRDU or Seo as before, using
the 10 possible binary comparisons between SR, CR0, CR25, M U 0 and M U 25.
For each of the 10 binary comparisons, we can count the number of consistent
36
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choice patterns of each subject for each set of theoretical predictions, and associate
the subject with the type delivering the highest number of consistent choices.
When this number is identical for several alternative theories, the weight received
by each of them is uniformly distributed. For example, if a subject reveals five
choices consistent with SEU and five choices consistent with ambiguity aversion
under KMM model, a weight 1/2 is associated with each of these two theories for
this subject. This procedure prevents any double counting of subjects and ensures
that the sum of individual types is the same as the sample size.
Table C.1: Individual types with two-stage perspective II
Ambiguity attitude
Compound risk and
model uncertainty attitudes
SEU

ambiguity neutral
ambiguity averse

KMM
ambiguity seeking
ambiguity averse
RRDU
ambiguity seeking
ambiguity averse
Seo
ambiguity seeking

AA
(ΠEE > 0)

AN
(ΠEE = 0)

AS
(ΠEE < 0)

7.5 (18.5)

24.5 (11.2)

0 (2.3)

32

6.8%

22.1%

0%

28.8%

21.83 (16.3)

5.5 (10)

1 (2)

28.33

19.7%

5%

0.9%

25.5%

1 (2.9)

1 (1.8)

3 (0.4)

5

0.9%

0.9%

2.7%

4.5%

25.83 (16.9)

3 (10.3)

0.5 (2.1)

29.33

23.3%

2.7%

0.5%

26.4%

0 (1.7)

3 (1.1)

0 (0.2)

3

0%

2.7%

0%

2.7%

5.83 (4.5)

2 (2.8)

0 (0.6)

7.83

5.3%

1.8%

0%

7.1%

2 (3.2)

0 (1.9)

3.5 (0.4)

5.5

1.8%

0%

3.2%

5%

64

39

8

111

Total
57.7%
35.1%
7.2%
Notes: Expected frequency under a null hypothesis of independence in parentheses.
Relative frequencies indicated in %.

Total

100%

Table C.1 reports the results of the classification based on the simple individual
analysis and shows their relation to the observed ambiguity attitudes. As can
be observed, the results are consistent with the ones obtained using the latent
mixture analysis in Section 5.4. In this simple type analysis however, we observe
that 71% of the subjects (79 out of 111) are classified as non-SEU. KMM model
still constitutes 30% of all observed preferences, whereas RRDU has now 29%, and
the theory of Seo has 12%. Turning to the compatibility with ambiguity attitudes
defined in terms of ΠEE , among subjects classified as SEU, 77% (24.5 out of 32) are
consistent in satisfying ambiguity neutrality. As with the latent mixture model,
we also observe that for the majority of non-SEU subjects, the preference patterns
within CR and M U are compatible with the observed ambiguity attitudes based
on preferences towards EE. The proportion of compatibility is in this case 74%
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(24.83 out of 33.33) for KMM model, 80% (25.83 out of 32.33) for RRDU, and
70% (9.33 out of 13.33) for the theory of Seo.

D

Order treatment

The eight situations {SR, CR0, CR25, M U 0, M U 25, M M 0, M M 25, EE} appeared to the subjects in a random order. We test the order effects by correlating
the CEs with the order of the situations. No order effect is detected. Table D.1
presents the average CEs of each situation by the order of appearance in the experiment. No correlation between certainty equivalents of the prospect in any
situation and the order of the situation is significantly different from zero, neither
when each situation is examined independently nor pooled together.
Table D.1: Variation in the Certainty Equivalents as a function of the
order of scenarios
Order

1st

SR
CR0
CR25
MU0
M U 25
MM0
M M 25
EE
Pooled

8.91
9.50
7.73
7.38
8.31
8.59
7.89
6.00
8.00

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

10.00
9.22
9.81
9.83
6.55
8.27
8.39
6.44
8.51

9.00
8.81
8.43
8.33
8.00
7.16
8.25
8.14
8.27

8.93
10.50
8.00
9.88
6.80
7.29
5.68
7.67
8.38

10.31
9.00
8.55
8.88
6.90
7.97
7.47
7.12
8.21

10.00
9.65
7.43
6.75
10.27
7.60
6.40
8.44
8.40

11.14
10.42
7.81
8.43
6.92
7.65
7.23
8.23
8.25

8.81
7.88
7.73
6.50
8.90
8.50
7.71
6.69
7.78

Pearson
correlation
0.05
-0.03
-0.08
-0.12
0.12
-0.03
-0.07
0.09
-0.02

p-value

0.60
0.77
0.39
0.19
0.20
0.78
0.45
0.30
0.54

Notes: each number in columns 2 to 9 is the average of CEs of the scenario shown in the corresponding order.
Pearson correlation is calculated between the scenario order and the CEs.
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